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Immigration-Refugee Act of 1980-resistance to female circumcision as grounds for political 
asylum in the United States 
IN RE KAsiNGA. Interim Decision 3278, 1996 Westlaw 379826, 35 ILM 1145 (1996). 
Board of Immigration Appeals,.June 13, 1996. 
Fauziya Kasinga appealed an immigration judge's decision of August 25, 1995, denying 
her political asylum, which she had claimed on the grounds that she would be forced 
to undergo female circumcision in her own country. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board) reversed, granted asylum, and ordered her admitted to the United States as an 
12 See, e.g., In re Sidali, 899 F.Supp. 1342, 1350 (D.NJ. 1995) (declining to decide the constitutionality of 
the eX:tradition statute "in favor of a full appellate review of Lobue'). 
13 See, e.g., Sandhu v. Bransom, 932 F.Supp. 822, 826 (N.D. Tex. 1996); In re Marzook, 924 F.Supp. 565, 
570-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Lin, 915 F.Supp. 206, 211-15 (D. Guam 1995); In re Sutton, !JOB F.Supp. 631 
(E.D. Mo. 1995); In re Lang, 905 F.Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F.Supp. 624 (S.D. 
Fla. 1995). Every district court that has decided the constitutional issues has declined to follow Lobue. 
14 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852). 
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asylee. The Board held: (1) that the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) 1 can 
be the basis for a claim of persecution; (2) that young women who are members of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to FGM as 
practiced by that tribe, and who oppose that practice, are recognized as members of a 
particular "social group" within the definition of the term "refugee" under section 
101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A)); and 
(3) that Kasinga had established that a reasonable person in her circumstances would 
fear countrywide persecution in Togo on account of her membership in this recognized 
social group, justifying an award of political asylum. 
In re Kasinga was brought before the Board of Immigration Appeals for hearing en 
bane in an unusual posture. In its first hearing en bane, the general counsel of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Service or INS) argued for a broader formula-
tion of political asylum based on FGM than did counsel for the applicant. Counsel for 
applicant argued her client's position within "traditional principles of asylum jurispru-
dence,"2 narrowly tailoring the grounds for asylum to the specific facts of the case. In 
contrast, the general counsel proposed a framework of analysis for all asylum petitions 
premised on the practice of female genital mutilation. The result is a narrowly written 
majority decision that seems deliberately minimalist to deemphasize its significance, with 
two concurring opinions joined by three Board members and one dissent without opin-
ion. Given the Service's acknowledgment that FGM could be grounds for asylum, the 
majority claimed it need only address whether this particular applicant was entitled to 
asylum on the basis of the record.3 
Kasinga, a nineteen-year-old native of Togo, is a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
Tribe of northern Togo. Young women of that tribe normally undergo female genital 
mutilation "of an extreme nature causing permanent damage" at age fifteen.4 Kasinga's 
influential father protected her from the practice until his death. On his death, however, 
her father's sister became the family authority figure under tribal custom and her mother 
was driven from the home. The aunt arranged a polygamous marriage to a man, and 
with him she planned to force Kasinga to submit to the procedure before consummation 
of the marriage. After fleeing to Ghana and Germany, Kasinga sought asylum in the 
United States where she had other relatives. Her aunt had reported her to the Togolese 
police, who were looking for her.5 
The Board evaluates asylum cases on their merits only if it first finqs that the facts 
asserted by an asylum applicant are true by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the 
Board's comprehensive review of the initial asylum hearing began with an independent 
inquiry into the credibility ofKasinga and her factual claims. Although the immigration 
judge had found Kasinga irrational, unpersuasive and inconsistent, the Board, in a 
lengthy discussion, found Kasinga rational, plausible and consistent.6 
1 This practice has also been termed "female circumcision," "traditional female genital surgery" (FGS), 
and "Irua." The nomenclature alone is a controversial subject. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and Female Genital 
Mutilation: Feminist Human IUghts Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HAR.v. HuM. RTS.]. 1, 2-3 (1995). In In 
re Kasinga, the court uses the term "FGM." For purposes of consistency, this note will use the same terminology. 
2 1996 WL 379826, L. Rosenberg, Concurring, at 1. 
~ 1996 WL 379826, L. Filppu & M. Heilman, Concurring, at 1. 
4 Id. at 5. 
~ Id. at 2-3. 
6 1996 WL 379826, Board at 8. Kasinga's story was subsequently corroborated by her family in Togo. See 
Cindy Shiner, Persecution by Circumcision: Woman Who Fled Togo Convinced U.S. Court but Not Town Elders, WASH. 
Posr,July 3, 1996, at Al. Her mother, who had given her almost all of her own $3,500 inheritance, eventually 
had to ask the family patriarch to forgive her and allow her to live in his home. Celia W. Dugger, A RefUgee's 
Body is Intact but her Family is Tom, N.Y. 'TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. 
The INS sought a remand in part based on credibility determinations. The majority had little difficulty 
dispensing with these issues because they were based on purported inconsistencies in the applicant's statements 
that did not affect the issues to be resolved. The opinion also emphasized that a remand was not necessary 
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The Board next considered whether Kasinga's factual claims met the statutory criteria 
for asylum under 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a)( 42)(A). The Board found that Kasinga feared "perse-
cution," her fear was well-founded, her "persecution" was "on account of" her member-
ship in a specific "social group," and she was unable to return to her country of nationality. 
With little discussion, the Board found Kasinga's fear that she would be forcibly circum-
cised to be well-founded. Several documents, including a report by a sociologist who had 
studied the various cultures of Togo and a memorandum prepared by the Department of 
State on FGM in Togo, confirmed that the traditions and mores of Kasinga's tribe 
mandate the mutilation of women intending to marry. Mutilation rates in Kasinga's tribe 
range from 85 to 98 percent. 
The Board devoted somewhat more discussion to the first of the two central questions 
in this case: whether or not FGM as practiced by Kasinga's tribe constitutes "persecu-
tion." This question has sparked fierce debate among academics and activists. Universal-
ists argue that fundamental human rights norms transcend culture; cultural relativists 
argue that defining FGM as "persecution" challenges the cultural autonomy of the 
nations in central Africa and the Arabian Peninsula that practice FGM. The World Health 
Organization, among other organizations, takes a universalist position, proclaiming FGM 
a form of violence against women and girls that violates "universally recognized human 
rights standards."7 
Kasinga's case extensively documented the effects of female genital mutilation, its 
international condemnation, and the poor human rights record of Togo, particularly 
with respect to women. In describing female genital mutilation and finding that the 
described level of harm constituted persecution, the majority relied heavily on the FGM 
Alert prepared by the INS Resource Information Center8 and a memorandum of May 
26, 1995, from Phyllis Coven in the Office of International Affairs of the INS on the 
1995 gender guidelines.9 The opinion also noted two State Department reports on 
human rights abuses in Togo. 
The court, implicitly adopting the universalist approach, accepted the position shared 
by Kasinga and the Service that there is no legitimate reason for FGM. Documents in 
the Board proceeding accurately defined FGM as the partial or total removal of the 
prepuce, clitoris, and inner and outer labia. In Togo, the practice involves clitorectomy, 
usually performed with crude instruments and without anesthetic. A State Department 
research report conducted and compiled by the Demographic Research Unit in the 
record of the Board's proceeding indicated that most Togolese excisors interviewed 
perform mutilations with razor blades, claiming that surgical knives are expensive and 
too difficult to clean. Girls in Kasinga's tribe are typically mutilated at fifteen years of 
age; mutilation just prior to marriagt:: would not be uncommon. 10 
The Board defined persecution as "the infliction of harm or suffering by a govern-
ment, or person a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a character-
istic of the victim." 11 Intent to punish is not a necessary element of persecution. Kasinga 
given the length of time h"er application had been pending. 1996 WL 379826, Board at 7-8. The applicant 
spent eight months in INS detention in several facilities, including one closed by a riot. Questioning this long-
term detention in light of the applicant's age, the novel issue presented by her case, and the lack of any 
known criminal record, the majority members suggested that "[t]he ·commissioner and the General Counsel 
mi.pht well wish to review the policy should future cases of this type arise." Id. at 9. 
In addition to condemnation by international governmental organizations, the International Federation 
of Gyneco;.:>gy and Obstetrics, the Council on Scientific Affairs, the International Medical Association, and 
the American Medical Association have also condemned FGM. 1996 WL 379826, Board at 11. 
8 Id. at 6. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 5, 11. 
11 Id. at 10 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211 (B.IA. 1985), 'TTUJdified on other grounds, In re Moghrabi, 
19 I & N Dec. 439 (B.IA. 1987)). 
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clearly established both harm and suffering: if circumcised, she could expect severe pain, 
shock, hemorrhage, tetanus or sepsis, urine retention, ulceration of the genital region 
and injury to adjacent tissue. These effects alone might prove fatal; assuming her survival 
of the procedure, long-term consequences could include cysts and abscesses, keloid scar 
formation, damage to the urethra resulting in urinary incontinence, dyspareunia, and 
a severely compromised, if not eradicated, capacity to experience sexual pleasure. 
The Board never addressed the second element of persecution: whether the harm or 
suffering was inflicted by a government or persons a government is unable to control. 
Yet this statutory element lies at the core of feminist critique of asylum law, as most 
torture experienced by women-including FGM-is inflicted by private, rather than 
public, agents. Indeed, persecution within the meaning of8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) has 
been difficult to establish in FGM cases because the perpetrators are often private citizens 
acting in a private capacity-usually, as here, relatives-operating without express state 
authority. Here, as is typical, the government does not perform the mutilations, and did 
not threaten to do so in Kasinga's case. At most, the Board had documents noting that 
no laws in Togo specifically outlaw FGM. The Board presumably accepted this as proof 
that the Togolese Government is unable or unwilling to control the agents of persecution. 
The Board then turned to the second central question: whether FGM, once designated 
persecution, is persecution against a protected group. The Refugee Convention12 and 
the Refugee Act of 1980 confer refugee status only upon those persons who can show 
persecution on the basis of their membership in one of five s~tutorily defined groups.13 
Gender-the group in which Kasinga would most logically claim membership-is not 
among them.14 Like all women seeking asylum on the basis of forms of persecution that 
exclusively or predominantly affect women (e.g., rape, FGM), Kasinga had to establish 
that she was a member of a "social group" singled out for persecution by persons whom 
her government was unable or unwilling to control. 
Kasinga relied upon, and the Board accepted, her designation as a member of a social 
group otherwise persecuted. The Board narrowly tailored the definition of social group 
to the facts of the case: young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not 
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice. The Board applied 
the test for social groups set forth in Acosta, which defines a "social group" under the 
1980 Refugee Act as 
a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The 
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or 
in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership .... [W]hatever the common characteristic that 
defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences.15 
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150; Protocol Relating to the 
Status ofRefugees,Jan. 31, 1967, 19 UST 6223,606 UNTS 267. 
1 ~ These categories are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (1994). 
14 Feminist critics of current asylum law note that while "political opinion" protects male-dominated activities 
(such as guerrilla activity, political agitation and union activity) and thus persecution of men, no comparable 
category exists to protect against the kinds of oppression women generally experience. For example, in a 1987 
case, the applicant had been raped by a military officer who threatened to expose her as a "subversive" if 
she resisted. To grant her asylum, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit characterized the Salvadoran 
woman as a person persecuted on the basis of "political opinion" by imputing to her a "political opinion" 
against the Salvadoran Government in power at the time. Lazo Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
15 In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other grounds, In re Moghrabi, 19 I & N Dec. 
439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
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Applying the Acosta criterion, the Board declared gender and tribal affiliation to be 
immutable characteristics. The court found intact genitalia to be a characteristic so 
fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she should not be required 
to change it. This categorization of "intact genitalia" as "fundamental to the individual 
identity of a young woman" sets an important precedent for immigration judges pre-
viously reluctant to acknowledge FGM as a form of persecution. 16 Having established 
FGM as a form of persecution, and Kasinga as a member of a "social group" worthy of 
refugee status, the Board had little difficulty in finding the necessary nexus: that Kasinga 
faces persecution "on account of" her membership in the class of women from her 
tribe who oppose FGM. 
The analysis of the critical definition of social group is the least satisfactory aspect of 
the majority opinion. What degree of affiliation or homogeneity is necessary to a social 
group? Can the social group be defined primarily by the harm that constitutes the 
persecution, or is a separate element oflinkage ·necessary? In this respect the concurring 
opinion of Lqry D. Rosenberg is the most thoughtful and helpful to future advocacy of 
women's claims. 
Citing various authorities for the proposition that the social group category is to be 
broadly construed as a "catchall" category beyond political opinion, race, religion or 
ethnicity, Rosenberg emphasizes that social group claims, unlike political opinion claims, 
are status based and do not necessarily require a showing that the specific individual's 
opinions or activities were the cause of the persecution. In the context of female genital 
mutilation, therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the applicant voiced opposi-
tion to the practice. Acknowledging that the 1995 gender guidelines refer INS employees 
to international human rights instruments in assessing claims for asylum, Rosenberg 
finds support for consideration of gender-related asylum claims under the social group 
category based on Canadian jurisprudence, the guidance of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees/' and the United States and Canadian gender guidelines.18 
In their concurring opinion, Board members Filppu and Heilman respond to the 
comprehensive arguments offered by the INS; the concurring opinion of Rosenberg 
elaborates on the terse majority opinion. Both concurring opinions illuminate the 
broader implications of this purportedly narrow, fact-specific decision. Filppu and 
Heilman emphasize that both parties agreed that female genital mutilation could amount 
to persecution, that there was an identifiable social group, and that the persecution was 
"on account of" the applicant's inclusion in that group.19 The parties differed, however, 
on the need for a remand and, most significantly, on the basis for finding female genital 
mutilation to be grounds for aSylum. 
16 For example, an immigration judge in Baltimore considering the asylum claim of a woman from Sierra 
Leone found, as did the court in Kasinga, that the applicant could not change her gender. The court concluded, 
however, that the applicant could change her mind with regard to her opposition to the FGM practices. The 
judge made no effort to determine if her attitudes about FGM (and, thus, her attitudes about the physical 
integrity of her genitalia) were "so fundamental to the individual's identity or conscience that she ought not 
to be required to change." Memorandum of Decision and Order [name and case number redacted] (U.S. 
Immigration Ct., Baltimore, Apr. 28, 1995). 
17 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Memorandum: Female Genital Mutilation (Geneva, 
UNHCR, Division of International Protection, May 1994). 
18 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 204, 205, & 216 (1996); see also Lena H. Sun, INS Expands Asylum Prot.~ction for Women, 
WASH. PoST, June 3, 1995, at A4: Judith Gaines, INS Eases Asylum Guidelines for Women, BoSTON GLOBE, May 
27, 1995, at 13; and Michael]. Sniffen, Immigration Rules Focus on Sexual Violence, PORTlAND OREGONIAN, May 
27, 1995, at A12; Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant 
to Section 65(B) of the Immigration Act: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 
(1993). 
19 1996 WI. 379826, L. Filppu & M. Heilman, Concurring, at 1. These Board members ~uggest that the 
comprehensive framework offered by the Service would be more appropriately proposed through the legislative 
or regulatory process. 
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The Board's inclusion of "opposition to FGM" as a factor in defining Kasinga's social 
group suggests that the Board was not prepared to address the potential for widespread 
application for asylum in the United States by women of Kasinga's tribe, Togo, or any 
country in which FGM is widely practiced. The Board itself pointed out that Kasinga's 
tribe circumcises young women and girls at rates approaching 100 percent. This concern 
is explicit in the SeiVice's formulation that persecution encompasses only practices that 
"shock the conscience" (although intent to punish is not deemed necessary). As pre-
viously noted, this formulation also anticipates the challenge of cultural activists that 
granting asylum to all victims ofFGM is an invasion of a nation's cultural autonomy. Yet 
cultural relativists focus on "survival and liberation of African women through their own 
activism,"20 and Kasinga has done precisely that-by literally flying away from a culture 
whose values she rejects. The Board in Kasinga would simply support an applicant's 
decision to condemn and reject FGM. 
The SeiVice's formulation also seeks to exclude previously circumcised women because 
"a woman once circumcised cannot ordinarily be subjected to FGM a second time."21 
This interpretation ignores the larger context in which FGM typically occurs: cultures 
that severely limit women's expression, choices and actions. The SeiVice's example of a 
small child as a consenting party is even more disturbing. This presumption of acquies-
cence for children directly conflicts with the recognized rights of children in the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child22 and directly contradicts the position of th~ UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees on the inclusion of children who may be subject to female 
genital mutilation as refugees.23 Surely with any such permanent and debilitating invasion 
ofbodily integrity, there should be a presumption of nonacquiescence until the individ-
ual has reached a level of maturity to make such a significant personal decision. 
The SeiVice also argued for remand on the question of whether the applicant could 
avoid female genital mutilation by moving to another part of Togo. The majority refused 
to remand, noting that (1) FGM is widely practiced in Togo; (2) acts of violence and 
abuse against women in Togo are tolerated by the police; (3) the Government of Togo 
has a poor human rights record; ( 4) most African women can expect little government 
protection from FGM; and (5) Togo is a small country of approximately twenty-two 
thousand square miles, slightly smaller than West Virginia. The majority also noted that 
the police were looking for the applicant, and her husband was a well-known individual 
who was a friend of the police. This line of argument and analysis is itself quite troubling 
in the context of gender-based violence. The conditions necessary to establish persecu-
tion a fortiori demonstrate at the least a failure on the part of the relevant government 
to provide effective protection. The majority's opinion suggests that the availability of 
asylum might tum on the status (or lack of status) of the woman's spouse, the size of 
the country, or generally unrealistic expectations that women within tightly woven tribal 
cultures and oppressive societies may simply move from one area of the country to 
another. 
20 Lewis, supra note 1. Canada was the first country to formulate gender guidelines for asylum; the United 
States was the second to do so. See Kristin E. Kandt, United States A.sylum Law: Rerognizing Persecution Based on 
Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEo. lMMIGR. LJ. 137 (1995). The gender guidelines are not technically 
binding on the BIA and, therefore, their use in the majority opinion is itself significant. Moreover, concurring 
Judge Rosenberg questions the failure of the Service to refer to the gender guidelines in the case. 1996 WL 
379826, L. Rosenberg, Concurring, at 5. 
21 1996 WL 379826, L. Filppu & M. Heilman, Concurring, at 1. 
22 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 12, GA Res. 44/25, Annex, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 
49, at 166, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), revised by UN Doc. A/RES/44/25/Corr.1 (1990), reprinted in 28 ILM 
1457 (1989); see also id., Arts. 19, 24(3), 37. 
2
' UN High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 17. 
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In re Kasinga is one of several cases in recent years brought before immigration judges 
by women seeking asylum in the United States to protect themselves24 or their children25 
from FGM. These cases are the latest development in the discussion of whether and, if 
so, when, treatment uniquely affecting women-such as rape,26 domestic violence,27 
hejab28 and FGM -can meet the elements required for asylum. 
The decision evades many thorny issues presented by such cases. It limits its protective 
impact to "young women not yet circumcised," and in so doing declines to take a 
position as to whether or not the practice of FGM alone suffices to render the women 
of a tribe or nation members of a persecuted group. An immigration judge in Virginia 
recently took that step, granting asylum in part on the basis of a woman's resistance to 
and subsequent fm;cibly imposed circumcision.29 In that case the experience of FGM 
established past persecution, and so created a showing of a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion," itself a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. This ruling contravenes the 
Service's proposed formulation, which would exclude all women already circumcised. 
At stake is whether women living in a society that practices FGM can be considered a 
persecuted class by virtue of living in such a society-meaning that all such women, 
circumcised or not, would meet the "other social group" criterion of section 
101(a) (42) (A). 
In re Kasinga is therefore a qualified success for women's rights advocates. The door 
has been opened by the Service's position and the Board's decision to recognize female 
genital mutilation as grounds for asylum. Yet that door may remain closed as a practical 
matter to many applicants without the representation, documentation and extraordi-
narily compelling facts available to this particular applicant. Kasinga was seventeen years 
old when her saga began; most children are mutilated much younger, far too young to 
allow them to seek asylum independently in the United States or anywhere else. 
The inability or unwillingness of the majority to elaborate on its findings of ''persecu-
tion," "social group" and the "on account of" nexus may be nothing more than an 
exercise in judicial economy, given the general consensus of the opposing parties. The 
eagerness of the majority to find agreement between the parties, however, even when 
in fact they disagreed on some elements (as in the precise definition of the social group 
with respect to personal opposition), suggests that critical points of analysis may yet be 
undecided or contentious among the Board members. 
Beyond its surface acceptance of female genital mutilation as grounds for asylum, the 
position of the Service on many of these critical points would exclude many more 
applicants than it would accept. First, only female genital mutilation "in its more severe 
forms" (such as would "shock the conscience") would qualify. Past victims would almost 
always be excluded, and there is, at the very least, the suggestion that small children 
whq would be subject to the procedure might be as well. A claimant would have to 
demonstrate that on return she would be seized and forcibly subjected to female genital 
mutilation; any pressure short of physical force would be insufficient. A possibility of 
relocation to another part of the country might defeat the claim, posing the problem 
that laws that ostensibly protect women from violence but are never enforced might yet 
24 See, e.g., Oral decision of the immigration judge [name and case number redacted] (Office of the Immigra-
tion Judge, Oklahoma City, Aug. 30, 1995); Memorandum of Decision and Order [name and case number 
redacted] (U.S. Immigration Ct., Baltimore, Apr. 28, 1995); In re M.K., No. A-72-374-558 (Office of the 
Immigration Judge, Arlington, Va., Apr. 20, 1995). 
25 See, e.g., Oral opinion of the Immigration Judge, In reOluloro, No. 172-147-491 (Office of the Immigration 
Judge, Seattle, Wash., Mar. 23, 1994). 
26 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
27 In re Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461 (B.I.A. 1975). 
28 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); but see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996). 
29 In re M.K., Deportation Proceedings, A-72-374-558 (U.S. Immigration Ct., Arlington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995). 
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bar women from being given asylum, and that societal and family pressure to submit 
short of physical force, however severe, would be insufficient grounds for asylum. Also, 
according to the INS brief, the "on account of" nexus is not demonstrated by a showing 
that the practice "may play a deeper political role or help perpetrate a system of male 
domination."30 With its emphasis in Kasinga on the extreme form of genital mutilation, 
the police searching for the applicant, and the unavailability of relocation, as well as its 
definition of the social group with reference to opposition to the practice, the majority 
opinion (deliberately or otherwise) provides implicit support for a number of the INS's 
limiting formulations. 
In re Kasingais, however, the first time a court with national jurisdiction has recognized 
that the circumcision of women can be a form of persecution. The m<Uority opinion, 
unfortunately, is not an easy "road map" for upcoming adjudications, as Rosenberg's 
concurring opinion suggests31 (indeed, her own opinion is much more helpful to future 
claimants) .32 In short, it is difficult to posit a more striking example of how exclusion 
of gender from recognized categories of discrimination and persecution has precluded 
full realization of women's rights. Those concerned about protecting women and girls 
facing FGM will still have many legal and practical hurdles to overcome in representing 
the women who will undoubtedly follow in Kasinga's footsteps. 
M Brief of the INS at 20. 
LINDA A. MALoNE 
William & Mary School of Law 
GILLIAN WooD 
J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School 
~• 1996 WL 379826, L. Rosenberg, Concurring, at 5. 
~2 The importance of BIA decisions should not be underestimated. Federal district and circuit courts of 
appeals have been very deferential to BIA decisions as an administrative law matter. See generaUy Krishna R 
Pa!el, Rerogniz.ing the Rape of Bosnian Women as GendeF-Based Persecution, 60 BROOKLYN L. REv. 929, 946 (1994). 
